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The security assurance of computer-based systems that rely on safety and se-
curity assurance, such as consistency, durability, efficiency and accessibility, 
require or need resources. This targets the System-of-Systems (SoS) problems 
with the exception of difficulties and concerns that apply similarly to subsys-
tem interactions on a single system and system-as-component interactions on 
a large information system. This research addresses security and information 
assurance for safety-critical systems, where security and safety are addressed 
before going to actual implementation/development phase for compo-
nent-based systems. For this purpose, require a conceptual idea or strategy 
that deals with the application logic security assurance issues. This may ex-
plore the vulnerability in single component or a reuse of specification in ex-
isting logic in component-based system. Keeping in view this situation, we 
have defined seven concepts of security assurance and security assurance de-
sign strategy for safety-critical systems. 
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The integration of components into industrial control systems such as railway 
control and management systems (CCS) is ongoing of commercial off-the-shelf 
hardware and software (COTS). However, the use of COTS components in a 
pre-owned security framework results in new security risks. The interplay of se-
curity is an important field of study in which several questions still need to be 
addressed. To mitigate risk and ensure the programme is dependable and secure; 
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security assurance is an essential part of the safety-critical software development 
process. Deficiencies in infrastructure and deficiencies also can lead to software 
bugs and abuse by hackers and offenders seeking to manipulate flaws in the tech 
industry. Testing, accreditation and evaluation are carried out to justify the level 
of assurance of safety of logical function during the intercommunication inte-
raction process. This strategy is applied at design stage that refers to traditional 
use to increase the trust of the programme in the programme validation process 
[1]. 
Software assurance during the engineering/development process has been an 
integral aspect of contemporary safety-critical systems’ overall innovation, 
ranging from weapons, avionic, even automotive control systems, industrial 
control systems and medical equipment. Software is used for tracking and regu-
lating physical processes in these systems increasing failure may lead to loss of 
life or other catastrophic malfunction. Therefore, software assurance for safe-
ty-critical systems performs a role as backbone in commercial-off-the-shelf 
component-based system [2]. 
Ever more software, including embedded systems, is no longer purpose-built 
in security systems. Instead, they are used (or reused) for COTS, GOTS Gov-
ernment off-the-shelf for software and hardware, open source, and other 
non-developmental applications, often without alteration or advanced setup 
changes. Much of this no developmental software—especially COTS and open 
source software—is component: stand-alone software pieces which can be used 
as a building block for creating larger and more complicated systems of software. 
The smallest independent decomposition unit in a software-based system may or 
may not be a component [3]. In certain cases, components with smaller modules 
are assembled. To be usable as a component of a broader framework, an auto-
nomous programme must provide interface(s), typically standardising to allow 
the integrating or mounting of other components. In this case, degree of com-
ponent assurance and system safety is foremost priority in information assur-
ance for safety-critical component-based software systems in organizational [4]. 
The most important aspect in security assurance of computer-based systems is 
inter-component specification. Interactions between the systems may be sepa-
rated by one component and another function consumption [5]. The service 
(function or calculation) provided to another component can be specified as a 
contract between the consumer component and the supplier component by one 
component and the services requested from the other component and details of 
interface(s) by which these provisions and applications are made [6]. The expec-
tations one component has regarding the contractual commitments other com-
ponents may meet are clearly specified as the preconditions or constraints the 
component sets on the other components with which it may communicate. 
In this research, we are going to address the effects of security and informa-
tion assurance on safety-critical component-based software systems, which dis-
cusses the security and safety in implementation & development process of sys-
tems. This requires a strategy to deal with the application logic security concerns 
F. Nabi et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2020.114018 294 Journal of Information Security 
 
that may explore the vulnerability in single component or a reuse of specifica-
tion of existing logic in component based system. 
2. Research Method 
We have used the applied research method for our research work. The method 
has a subclass called research evaluation. In this method, we address and assess-
ment analysis is a kind of analytical study evaluating current research knowledge 
that is subject to empirical study results or to informed decision-making [7], for 
example, a scientific method of investigation because it applies existing scientific 
knowledge to consolidate situations to perform appraisal analysis to decide the 
research problem and proposed theory. Therefore keeping in view this research 
method, we have proposed seven concepts for information assurance for safe-
ty-critical component-based software. 
3. Background of Research 
The speeding up of attacks as well as the obvious shift to further vulnerability 
appear to mean that our ability to resolve attacks diminishes and the divide be-
tween attacks and information defence broaden. Most of the modern informa-
tion security is based upon concepts as defined by Saltzer and Schroeder in the 
1974 ACM Communications article entitled “The Security of Information in 
Computer Systems”. Protection was characterised as “techniques to monitor 
who may access or change the device or information stored therein” and the 
three key categories of concern were described: secrecy, credibility and availabil-
ity [8]. 
We constitute the security assurance in cyber security and information assur-
ance for safety-critical component-based software systems as: 
“Software Assurance considered as security is a trust degree of protection 
from software several bugs, designed purposefully or unintentionally, are im-
plemented in the software at any point during its life cycle such therefore the 
software works as intended”. 
With vulnerability breaches expanding through ransomware, bugs, and injec-
tions of structured query language (SQL), cross-site scripting, etc., these chal-
lenges have altered the structure and functionality of the programme. It has 
proven to be incredibly inadequate to rely solely on identity security. In addi-
tion, the importance of software in networks has evolved such that software now 
manages the majority of functionality and increases the effect of security failure 
[9]. 
The convergence and interoperation of security and safety-critical systems is 
becoming more and more apparent. It makes sense, therefore, to create an over-
all concept of software assurance covering safety and protection. The various 
methods proposed by the current concepts emerge in several cases from threats 
associated with complex structures [10]. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of commercial off-shelf (COTS) and open-source 
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software as modules within a framework creates additional challenges for suc-
cessful operating protection. The resulting operating systems combine applica-
tions from a wide variety of sources and assemble each piece in a distinct man-
ner [11]. 
Systems cannot be built to eliminate safety risks but have the ability to recog-
nise, resist and recover from attacks. The system should be prepared for imple-
mentation and maintenance in the initial acquisition and design. In order to en-
sure successful organisational protection over time, assurance must be scheduled 
over the life cycle [12]. 
Now we use the following concept of component-based software lifecycle as-
surance built for: 
Technologies and procedures are implemented to obtain the required degree 
of trust that applications and services work as expected are free of unintentional 
or deliberate flaws and have threat-friendly protection functionality as well as 
recovery from intrusions and failures. 
4. Existing Research Review  
There is not very much research work is done in the domain of security assur-
ance unification process of safety-critical component-based software systems. 
However, we have considered some important work to cite the research work to 
underpin with the effort of research design. 
According to Faisal Nabi 2017, proposed security assurance unification 
process that defines. 
Author describes the architecture in two stages of abstraction of an informa-
tion system. 
1) The design level of the method explains form for architectural form levels 
to be implemented at the highest-level abstraction. 
2) The architecture definition of a logical part. 
To ensure safe deployment, protection needs to be applied using a design ap-
proach, rather than implementing a layer in the framework, by co-operation 
with the above-mentioned core elements of the security assurance process. The 
architecture can therefore be extracted by means of protection the assurance 
protocol course [1]. 
According to Tim Kelly 2019 explained that an alternative solution by estab-
lishing a structure for compliance and data assurance (SSAF) focused on the 
fundamental set of standards of security. Instead of a popular co-assurance, 
which has identified major disadvantages, protection and safety should be indi-
vidually co-assured. This often permits different processes and practitioners’ 
skills in each area. With this arrangement, attention is transferred from simpler 
convergence to integration through the correct knowledge exchange with the 
synchronisation activities at the right time [3]. 
According to Marsha Chechik (B, Rick Salay, Torin Viger, Sahar Kokaly, and 
Mona Rahimi 2019), Addresses the Test cases, test data, human decision or a 
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mixture of these will provide data for software assurance. This means that ex-
perts strive to construct (safety-critical) structures with caution and to express 
that reasoning according to well-founded methodology in a safety case that is 
eventually tested by an individual. However, tech has deeper origins in uncer-
tainty, the most complicated open world features (for example, a self-driven ve-
hicle’s understanding of the state of the earth) often are not entirely predictable 
or not cost-effective; computing applications are also put in dangerous condi-
tions, and there can be inconsistencies [2]. 
Impact of Safety & Security Risk 
Risk factors are security threats that add safety hazards to a system when discov-
ered. Security impact risks are directly risks to the system’s Integrity and availa-
bility characteristics. 
Integrity is a security feature directly connected to durability and trustwor-
thiness: it depends on its durability that it is not modified inadvertently, by mis-
take, by an unwanted entity, or through illegal means, either accidentally or 
purposely. The trust of the device is not compromised such that bugs or decep-
tive reasoning can be implemented [13]. The credibility of the system is there-
fore critical because unauthorised and unintended changes can only impair the 
system’s ability to run effectively, but may also prone the system to unnecessary 
compromises and/or incorporate unauthorised functions. In all cases, such 
modifications often wrongly indicate any of the conclusions based on careful 
examination and review of the system before it is implemented. 
Assuring the consistency of the system guarantees that the system is intact and 
that the system decisions are valid. 
Another security feature is closely associated with system reliability. To be 
available the system must, as defined in its specifications (e.g. 99 percent of the 
time, 95 percent of the time, etc.) be active and open to its intended users. The 
availability is similar to the “required uptime” and “quality of service”, only that 
it not only covers the system’s operating consistency and the consistency of sys-
tem connectivity for those who use it. 
5. Proposed Concept of Security Assurance Safety-Critical  
Systems 
Components are engineered primarily to be combined into systems, and they re-
ally require security eventually. Composing security cations into broader systems 
is not only a non-trivial task, but also one of the toughly unanswered informa-
tion security issues, in order to deal with this issue in the business logic of a com-
pound (logical component-ware interface-orientated design) in an e-commerce 
application. For logical component-based fast advances, and for an increasingly 
increasing business process logic in e-commerce systems, we need the conver-
gence of security process resources as shown in Figure 1. 
In order to reach a desired degree of trust for software security assurance, we 
recommend the seven concepts aimed at solving the problems associated with  
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Figure 1. Security assurance process and properties of unification. 
 
the information assurance for safety-critical component-based software systems, 
construction, deployment and retaining of systems. 
1) Risk guides decision-making in assurance. A risk-taking perception guides 
decision-making. Organizations that do not obtain reliable security assurances 
experience danger from efficient attacks on infrastructure and systems. They can 
use assurance options as a function of their perceptions of a threat of similar at-
tack and the anticipated effect, such as strategies, procedures, methods and limi-
tations, if this threat is understood. Organisation, because they struggle to grasp 
their challenges and impacts, may falsely interpret risks. Efficient security allows 
businesses to share risk awareness with both partners and participants of the 
project. 
2) Risk issues shall be associated with both stakeholders and strategic aspects 
intertwined. Highly linked networks such as the Internet require coordination of 
risk between all players involved and all technical elements linked to them; oth-
erwise, at various points in the relationships, important risks are overlooked or 
ignored. When all are deeply intertwined, it is not enough to consider just deeply 
essential elements. Interactions are carried out at different levels of technology 
(e.g., network, security, infrastructure, and applications) and are assisted by a 
number of functions. Security at any of the stages may be applied and, if not well 
planned, may clash. Effective assurance requires clear identification, response to 
risk at all levels, and positions related to interactions. 
3) When proved trustworthy, dependencies are not to be trusted. Because of 
the extensive use of digital supply chains, the guarantee of an automated com-
modity relies on the judgments of those in terms of commitment and the degree 
of faith imposed in them. All the guarantees’ shortcomings of each communi-
cating component come from the optimised applications. In addition, any oper-
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ating function, including utilities, security software and other programmes, is 
subject to the guarantee of any other function unless unique constraints and 
controls are in effect. A company still relies on the guarantee decisions of others. 
There is a chance. Organizations have to determine, however, how much confi-
dence they put in their reliance on a practical appraisal of risks, consequences 
and opportunities across diverse experiences. Dependences are not stagnant and 
businesses have to revisit confidence ties on a daily basis to assess adjustments to 
be rethought. 
The following examples define assurance damages from weakness: 
­ Centralized technology vulnerabilities (e.g. operating systems, programming 
environments, firewalls, and routers) can act as publicly accessible software 
vulnerability entry points. 
­ The use of several common technology construction development tools effi-
ciently assures the resulting digital product. The tool manufacturers may in-
troduce vulnerabilities into software products. 
4) Attacks are expected. The secrecy, credibility and availability of technical 
resources are sacrificed for a wide group of assailants with increasing technolo-
gical capabilities. No security from attacks is flawless and the profile of the at-
tacker continues to evolve. In order to reach a consensus (known as so-
cial-technical response), attackers are using technologies, procedures, norms and 
practise. Some threats are using technologies, and others create unique condi-
tions to exploit protections. They are the way we use technologies.  
5) Ensuring that the software assurance concerned needs good teamwork. 
Organizations must extend security throughout their employees, procedures and 
technologies while assailants seek all potential access points. In addition, orga-
nisations must specifically define at an adequate level the policy authority and 
obligation for ensuring that corporate participants engage efficiently in cyber 
security. This theory presupposes that everybody is confident, but generally, it is 
not. Therefore, organisations need to prepare staff to maintain tech. 
6) The guarantee is creative and well planned. Assurance may have a bridge 
between software and network administration, design and service and is ex-
tremely susceptible to improvements in any of these fields. To preserve this 
equilibrium, it is important to respond to frequent shifts, interconnections, or-
ganisational use and risks of applications. This is not a one-time occurrence, be-
cause transition is regular. It needs to proceed by organisational monitoring af-
ter the initial organisational deployment. This must be incorporated into the 
appropriate promise that companies require. This will not be added later. Every 
time, nobody has money to overhaul structures. 
7) An overall assurance assessment and evaluation process should be imple-
mented. Organizations cannot cope with something they cannot calculate, and 
consumers and consumers of technology will not take responsibility for policies 
until they take responsibility for it. If outcomes are tracked and calculated, Con-
fidence cannot compete with other competitive needs effectively. To determine 
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organisational assurance, all socio-technical elements like policies, processes and 
procedures need to be connected together. More efficient assurance process re-
sponds and rebound more quickly. They will benefit about their and others’ 
reactive reactions, and predict and identify threats more carefully. 
For Example: Code faults is a standard implementation metric, and can be 
useful for code consistency, but is not acceptable proof for general certainty 
since it gives little insight into how code functions in an operating environment. 
Concentrating and systematic steps must be taken by organisations, to ensure 
sound protection is established for the components and efficient assurance of the 
relationship within components. 
Evaluation Security Assurance Level Analysis Chart (Table 1) 
The security assurance is achieved through the validity of empirical analysis of 
proposed concepts and the process of system assurance, as it is explained in the 
given below model. This depicts the seven stages of security assurance level for 
information assurance that is concluded based on proposed seven concepts for 
safety-critical component-based software systems. 
 
Table 1. Evaluation of security assurance in safety-critical systems. 
Evaluation  
assurance level 
What is tested Description 
1 Functionality 
Evaluation provides independent testing against a specification and an examination of the  
guidance documentation. Used when confidence in correct operation is required but the threats to 
security are not viewed as serious. 
2 Structure 
Evaluation provides a low to moderate level of independently assured security as Required by  
vendors or users. 
3 Methodology 
Evaluation provides an analysis supported by testing, selective independent confirmation of the 
vendor test results, and evidence of a vendor search for obvious vulnerabilities. 
4 Methodology and Design 
Evaluation provides a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional 
commodity products. Testing is supported by an independent search for obvious vulnerabilities. 
5 Semiformal Design 
Evaluation provides a high level of independently assured security in a planned development, with 
a rigorous development approach. The search for vulnerabilities must ensure resistance to  
penetration attackers with a moderate attack potential. 
6 Semiformal Verified Design 
Used for the development of specialized security products, for application in high risk situations. 
The independent search for vulnerabilities must ensure resistance to penetration attackers with a 
high attack potential. 
7 Formal Design 
Used in the development of security products for application in extremely high risk situations. 
Evidence of vendor testing and complete independent confirmation of vendor test results are. 
6. Designed Defensive Strategy as a Solution to Deal  
Business Logic Layer Concerns 
This part of strategy will provide a strong risk management control plan focus-
ing on providing rigours component ware assurance for rapid development of 
CBSD business application logic for safety-critical component-based software 
systems and its applications in e-commerce domain. 
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Key elements of problem solution follow: 1) Strong risk management plan; 2) 
Solution artefacts; 3) Security characteristics of component-ware components. 
1) Strong risk management plan: 
Ensure that every aspect of the application’s design must be clearly & suffi-
ciently detailed to understand every assumption and designed function logic 
within the application by designer. 
Mandate that all CBSD should be clearly commented to include the following 
information throughout. 
a) The purpose and intended use of each component (if component code 
available information of code, if not, its functional business logic within the 
component through usage contract description).  
b) The assumptions & logic made by each component about anything that is 
outside of its direct control. 
c) Reference to all client-component which makes use of the component clear 
documentation to this effect could have prevented the logic flaw within the on-
line registration functionality.  
(Note: Client here dose not refer to the user-end of the client-server relation-
ship but to other component (code) for which the component being considered 
is an Immediate dependency.) 
2) Solution Artifacts: As that there is no unique signature by which logic 
flaws in component-Based-Rapid developed web software application can be 
identified, because there is no silver bullet so far developed which could protect. 
Good Practice: Good practice that can be applied to significantly reduce the 
risk of logical flaws appearing within component-based-development and its 
logic. 
3) Security Characteristics of Component Ware Components: Since a 
software component can be regarded as an IT product or system, it is natural to 
use the Common Criteria in assessing its security properties. The Common Cri-
teria provide a framework for evaluating IT systems, and enumerate the specific 
security requirements for such systems. The security requirements are divided 
into two categories:  
• Security functional requirements 
• Security assurance requirements 
The security functional requirements: 
Describe the desired security behaviour or functions expected of an IT system 
to counter threats in the system’s operating environment. These requirements 
are classified according to the security issues they address, and with varied levels 
of security strength. They include requirements in the following classes: security 
audit, communication, cryptographic support, user data protection, identifica-
tion and authentication, security management, privacy, protection of system se-
curity functions (security meta-data), resource utilization, system access, and 
trusted path/channels.  
The security assurance requirements: 
The security functional requirements mainly concern the development and 
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operational process of the IT system, with the view that a more defined and ri-
gorous process delivers higher confidence in the system’s security behaviour and 
operation. These requirements are classified according to the process issues they 
address, and with varied levels of security strength. The process issues include 
life cycle support, configuration management, development, tests, vulnerability 
assessment, guidance documents, delivery and operation, and assurance main-
tenance.  
Figure 2 presents the idea of security assurance process based on layer of se-
curity assurance of component-based software application logic for e-commerce 
systems. This process is also helpful for developers of safety-critical compo-




Figure 2. Design strategy process for security assurance business application logic. 
 
Therefore, it is important that safety-critical systems, those are almost in daily 
use of human interaction and from simple system to complex systems of com-
ponent based require assurance before passing through development phase that 
guarantee the safety of the system in various environment.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper addressed some of the key problems and information gaps in defence 
and protection in big, complex systems. These flaws are due to gaps between 
protection and safety systems, how threats are portrayed and clarified, and how 
claims should be viewed as templates. The seven concepts were described as a 
Safety Assurance and design security assurance strategy mechanism solution for 
the independent system or component to the difficulties of developing a me-
chanism that synchronises separate security and safety assurances and provides a 
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more sophisticated and complex form of evaluating impacts. The seven concepts 
are blue print capable of modifying the relationship of the intelligence and secu-
rity sectors and security design strategy process of modelling help developers to 
make sure the system security assurance at SDLC stage, which is proved to be as 
a guideline for safety-critical component-based software systems. 
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